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        1 - Contexts and Causes of Posing Inconsistent Philosophical Theories in Mulla Sadra’s Works
        Saeed  Anvari
        In his various works, Mulla Sadra has presented different views concerning certain philosophical issues which cannot be gathered in a single philosophical system. In this paper, with reference to such issues, the writers have examined the causes of these different views More
        In his various works, Mulla Sadra has presented different views concerning certain philosophical issues which cannot be gathered in a single philosophical system. In this paper, with reference to such issues, the writers have examined the causes of these different views. For a more thorough study of the related cases, they have investigated different theories including the trans-substantial motion, the mediating movement, the cause of time, the nature of knowledge, God’s knowledge of particulars, divine activity, the cause-effect relation, the criterion for the dependence of possible beings on the Necessary Being, meanings of quiddity, the quality of attribution of existence to quiddity, unity of being, immateriality, and createdness of the soul. A study of these issues indicate that the existence of different views in Mulla Sadra’s works is rooted in one of the following factors: 1) a change in his philosophical theories and ideas over time (initially, he believed in the principiality of quiddity, then in the principiality of existence and gradedness of being, and finally in the individual unity of existence); 2) observing the instructional aspect in expressing his views, 3) posing his theories based on different principles (people, graded unity of being, and individual unity of existence); 4) trying to compose a pseudo-encyclopedic series of books on philosophical discussions. Manuscript profile
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        2 - A Critical Study of the Objections against Ḥakīm Ghomsheī’s Argument on Demonstrating the Necessity of God’s Existence
        Reza Hesari Mojtaba Mirdamadi Abolfazl Rezai
        Several arguments have been adduced on demonstrating the individual unity of being. Most of these arguments, which have been presented by such gnostics as Dāvood Qayṣarī, Ḥamzah Fanārī, and Ibn Turkah, suffer from some defects in terms of a confusion of concept and refe More
        Several arguments have been adduced on demonstrating the individual unity of being. Most of these arguments, which have been presented by such gnostics as Dāvood Qayṣarī, Ḥamzah Fanārī, and Ibn Turkah, suffer from some defects in terms of a confusion of concept and referent. In his glosses on Tamhīd al-qawā’id (the section on the arguments on the demonstration of the individual unity of existence), Ḥakīm Moḥammad Rezā Ghomsheī has presented an argument which demonstrates the pre-eternal necessity of God. However, three criticisms have been advanced against it. The first concerns the meaning of the absolute nature of being, which has been stated ambiguously. The second criticism questions the confusion of concept and referent. The first part of the third criticism targets the whole argument, based on the presupposition of the realization of the essence of nature, and its second part objects to the consistency of the realization of the essence of the nature of existence with limited existences, as acknowledged in Ghomsheī’s argument. Finally, the fourth focuses on the absence of any kind of innovation in this argument. Following an analytic-comparative method, this paper examines all these criticisms and responds to the first three of them. Accordingly, the authors acknowledge the truth of Ḥakīm Ghomsheī’s argument by presenting a detailed discussion in this paper. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Study of Ḥakīm Khājūī’s Objections to the Gnostic Theory of Oneness of Being
        Mahmud  Seydi Mohammad Javad  Pashaei
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and c More
        As the basis of theoretical gnosis, oneness of being has provoked several debates among thinkers in the history of Islamic philosophy. Mullā Ismā‘īl Khājūī, one of the thinkers and Mutikallimun of the Safavid period and post-Sadrian era, has criticized this theory and challenged it from different aspects. Khājūī rejects this theory based on the ontological differences between the Necessary Being and possible beings, absence of absoluteness in the Necessary Being, the lack of a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, and the inefficiency of the arguments of some gnostics and mystics on proving this oneness. However, the present study postulates that Khājūī’s criticisms originate in confusing the different meanings of certain key terms in philosophical sciences and kalām with those in theoretical gnosis. Nevertheless, it seems that in certain cases, such as gnostics’ failure in adducing a rational argument for demonstrating the oneness of being, his criticism is justified. Manuscript profile